Why EU Law Claims Supremacy by Lindeboom, Justin
 
 
 University of Groningen
Why EU Law Claims Supremacy
Lindeboom, Justin
Published in:
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
DOI:
10.1093/ojls/gqy008
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Final author's version (accepted by publisher, after peer review)
Publication date:
2018
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Lindeboom, J. (2018). Why EU Law Claims Supremacy. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 38(2), 328-356.
https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqy008
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the









This article explores the conception of law that underlies the CJEU’s case-law, building 
on Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR as a topical example. Joxerramon 
Bengoetxea’s metaphor of the CJEU being a ‘Dworkinian court’ fails to explain 
fundamental aspects of the Court’s case-law which are incompatible with Dworkin’s 
theory of law. Instead, the CJEU is committed to an EU legal system which conforms to 
Joseph Raz’s theory of the necessary conditions for legal systems: comprehensiveness, 
openness, and a claim of supremacy. Within this paradigm, the supremacy claim of EU 
law is in need of demystification because it is inherent to any legal system. Paradoxically, 
while Opinion 2/13 suggests that the EU should be given special treatment in its accession 
to the ECHR, the Court’s underlying conception of the EU legal system is essentially 
mimetic of the typical characteristics of national legal systems. This mimetic nature of 
the EU legal system entails a dissociation between the political and the legal nature of 








The first storm of academic commentary on Opinion 2/13 concerning the draft agreement 
on the European Union (EU)’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights 
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(ECHR)1 seems to have passed, if only because the overwhelming majority of scholars 
dismissed the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU or Court) verdict.2 In 
Opinion 2/13 the CJEU held that the draft accession agreement violated EU law for a 
plethora of reasons, all related to the supremacy of EU law and the interpretative 
prerogatives of the Court itself.3 The Court has been criticised for being ‘very fearful’,4 
for depriving EU law of the Rule of Law,5 for refusing to engage in judicial dialogue,6 
for prioritising economic integration and mutual trust over fundamental rights,7 and even 
for giving an opinion that is ‘fundamentally flawed’8 and ‘exceptionally poor’.9 Those 
scholars who presented a more optimistic perspective on the Opinion did so while 
hurrying to add that they did not wish to defend the Court.10  
                                                           
1 Opinion 2/13 on the accession of the EU to the ECHR, EU:C:2014:2454. 
2 See eg, LFM Besselink, ‘Acceding to the ECHR Notwithstanding the Court of Justice Opinion 2/13’, 
Verfassungsblog (23 December 2014) available at http://verfassungsblog.de/acceding-echr-
notwithstanding-court-justice-opinion-213-2/; S Douglas-Scott, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the 
ECHR: a Christmas Bombshell from the European Court of Justice’, UK Constitutional Law Blog (24 
December 2014); M Wendel, ‘Mehr Offenheit wagen! Eine kritische Annäherung andas Gutachten des 
EuGH zum EMRK-Beitritt’, Verfassungsblog (21 December 2014); D Kochenov, ‘EU Law without the 
Rule of Law: Is the Veneration of Autonomy Worth It?’ (2015) 34 YEL 74; E Spaventa, ‘A Very Fearful 
Court? The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European Union after Opinion 2/13’ (2015) 22 MJ 35; 
P Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue – Autonomy or Autarky?’ 
(2015) 38 Fordham ILJ 955; S Peers, ‘The EU’s Accession to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a 
Nightmare’ (2015) 16 GLJ 213. Christoph Krenn and Daniel Halberstam are among the very few to have 
expressed (at least somewhat) more positive comments. See C Krenn, ‘Autonomy and Effectiveness as 
Common Concerns: A Path to ECHR Accession after Opinion 2/13’ (2015) 16 GLJ 147; and D Halberstam, 
‘“It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defence of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, and the 
Way Forward’ (2015) 16 GLJ 105. 
3 For an overview of the CJEU’s arguments, see in particular Halberstam (n 2), and Eeckhout (n 2). 
4 Spaventa (n 2). 
5 Kochenov (n 2). 
6 Eeckhout (n 2). 
7 ibid. 
8 Peers (n 2). 
9 Steve Peers’s first response to Opinion 2/13 on Twitter: ‘My summary of CJEU ruling on EU accession 
to ECHR. Blog post coming later. Preview: an exceptionally poor judgment’ (18 December 2014), available 
at https://twitter.com/StevePeers/status/545523536551768064. 




In this article, I will argue that the radical divergence between the Court and the 
majority of scholars is not ultimately rooted in different views on what EU law prescribes 
in this specific case but in different views on what law is in general (and what is not). 
Many commentators rejected the Court’s conclusion and reasoning on the basis of 
arguably Dworkinian assumptions about the conditions for legal validity. As such, these 
criticisms are remarkable in light of the fact that an influential work on the legal reasoning 
of the CJEU claimed that the Court itself is a ‘Dworkinian court’.11 By contrast, the main 
thesis of this article is that the CJEU’s jurisprudence reveals a conception of the EU legal 
system which can be linked to Joseph Raz’s theory of the necessary conditions for legal 
systems. 
This thesis is further divided in the following two basic claims. First, the CJEU’s 
constitutional jurisprudence can be explained from the viewpoint of Raz’s claim that legal 
systems necessarily claim comprehensive supremacy, thus reflecting a truism about the 
concept of law itself. Second, the connection between Raz’ theory of legal systems and 
the CJEU’s conception of the EU legal system can be explained by the mimetic nature of 
EU law: in its construction of the EU legal system, the CJEU imitates the typical 
characteristics of national legal systems. The implicit apotheosis of this mimesis can be 
found in Opinion 2/13, where the key problem underlying the Court’s concern is that the 
draft accession agreement treats the EU legal system as different from a national legal 
system. 
In this article, I do not want to engage directly with the legal philosophical debate on 
the universal nature of law. Neither do I want to argue that the Court ought to be behave 
more ‘Dworkinian’ or more ‘Razian’. My objective is merely to provide a rational 
construction of the Court’s jurisprudence and demonstrate how this jurisprudence is 
connected to a particular theory of law. Arguably, the self-conception of courts and their 
conception of law is relevant for the concept of law,12 and only in this marginal sense this 
article might contribute to analytical jurisprudence itself. While it is often asserted that 
the traditional theories of law are outdated in the current, globalised legal landscape, the 
mimetic nature of EU law demonstrates that at least the EU legal system can be explained 
by existing theories of law. 
                                                           
11 J Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice (Clarendon Press 1993) vi. 




This article is structured as follows. Section 2 will demonstrate that the metaphor of 
the CJEU being a ‘Dworkinian court’, famously introduced by Joxerramon Bengoetxea, 
fails to explain essential elements of the CJEU’s case-law, in particular its legal reasoning 
in Opinion 2/13, which are incompatible with Dworkin’s theory of law. Section 3 applies 
Raz’s theory of the necessary conditions of legal systems to the CJEU’s case-law on the 
foundations and nature of EU law, showing how it can explain the Court’s reasoning and 
its philosophical assumptions. Section 4 explains the Court’s shaping of the EU legal 
system by linking it to a mimesis of the national legal systems. Hence, it is argued that 
the Court’s conception of the EU legal system may be rooted in its construction of a legal 
system which possesses the exact same typical features as national legal systems, thereby 
mimicking precisely those features which arguably distinguish national legal systems 
from other normative, social systems.13 Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Farewell to the Dworkinian Court 
 
A. What is a Dworkinian court? 
In his seminal work The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice, Joxerramon 
Bengoetxea introduced the metaphor of the CJEU as a ‘Dworkinian court’: a court 
committed to a globally coherent14 case-law in light of the overall objective of furthering 
European integration, thus developing a ‘community of principle’.15 This metaphor is a 
powerful one. While the Court has often found itself torn between deciding according to 
one principle or the other, not least because of the open-endedness of the Treaty 
                                                           
13 The connection between Raz’s theory of legal systems and the CJEU’s conception of the EU legal 
system presumes that Raz’s theory accurately describes the typical characteristics of national legal 
systems. See further sections 3 and 4 below. 
14 I understand Bengoetxea’s thesis that the CJEU is committed to a ‘globally coherent’ case-law to mean 
that the CJEU strives to interpret individual norms of EU law such that they cohere as much as possible 
with the rules and principles of the entire EU legal system.  
15 Bengoetxea (n 11) vi. See also J Bengoetxea, N MacCormick and L Moral Soriano, ‘Integration and 
Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ in G de Búrca and JHH Weiler (eds), 




provisions,16 it has rarely departed from the road taken after making a particular choice.17 
The self-referential character of the Court’s legal reasoning is well known, and Opinion 
2/13 is no exception.18 
Ronald Dworkin’s normative jurisprudence is indeed centred on the value of what he 
calls integrity, or ‘consistency of principle’. He believed law is essentially an 
interpretative practice, where courts endeavour to construct the meaning of rules and 
principles in accordance with the most coherent image of the political morality of their 
political community, as represented by past (judicial) decisions.19 The courts should thus 
interpret legal norms as much as possible as forming part of one coherent legal and 
political community. However, the normative role of integrity in legal interpretation 
cannot be dissociated from Dworkin’s theory of law. Dworkin’s theory of interpretation 
is both normative and descriptive as he purports to demonstrate that this is both how 
courts should interpret the law, but also what constitutes law. In other words, law is that 
which justifies state coercion, with the justification lying precisely in the most coherent 
and morally best interpretation of the available legal materials and the practice of law as 
a whole. Accordingly, the value of integrity and the need for courts to commit to it can 
only be properly understood by virtue of Dworkin’s key thesis that legality is ultimately 
                                                           
16 See G Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Hart Publishing 2012) 
ch 6. See also K Lenaerts and JA Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘To Say What the Law of the European Union Is. Methods 
of Interpretation and the European Court of Justice’ (2014) 20 CJEL 3. 
17 Among the rare exceptions to this general trend are, for example, Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 
Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard, EU:C:1993:905. See further M Jacob, 
Precedents and Case-based Reasoning in the European Court of Justice (Cambridge University Press 
2014) 159–176.  
18 See eg, Opinion 2/13 (n 1) paras 157, 166 and 176 on the autonomy and supremacy of EU law. 
19 Integrity, in the sense of consistency of principle, is generally understood to reflect Dworkin’s 
commitment to ‘global coherence’ in legal interpretation. See eg, B.B. Levenbook, ‘The Role of Coherence 
in Legal Reasoning’ (1984) 3 Law and Philosophy 355. See however J Raz, ‘The Relevance of Coherence’ 
(1992) 72 Boston University Law Review 273. Moreover, the role of coherence in Dworkin’s theory is 
rather ambiguous, as it is used both as a methodological and a substantive concept. For a critical analysis 
of Dworkin’s theory, see A Marmor, ‘Coherence, Holism, and Interpretation: The Epistemic Foundations 




rooted in objective morality,20 and that legal validity is always (partly) a matter of moral 
judgment.21  
A truly Dworkinian court, therefore, is committed to a globally coherent (case-)law 
– if we understand Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity in this way22 – not for the sake 
of being consistent or because some written or unwritten rule states that past decisions 
must be followed. Instead, it considers itself bound to a set of moral principles that makes 
the available legal materials stick together as one coherent, and therefore morally 
justified, system. For Dworkin, and thus for a ‘Dworkinian court’, the systematicity of 
law is content-dependent, and necessarily moral, in nature. 
 
B. Can Opinion 2/13 be Dworkinian? 
Since it is beyond dispute that Opinion 2/13 does not serve the cause of human rights 
protection in Europe, the more relevant question is whether the Court’s concerns can be 
explained consistently with the metaphor of a Dworkinian CJEU. The arguments 
advanced by the Court will not be reiterated in great detail, as they are generally well 
known and have been aptly summarised elsewhere.23 The Court declared the draft 
accession agreement incompatible with the Treaties for a number of reasons, all of which 
were related to the normative authority of EU law, and the judicial authority of the CJEU. 
Fearful of any possibility – hypothetical or otherwise – that the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR or Strasbourg Court) could decide on the jurisdiction of EU law through 
the proposed prior involvement and co-respondent procedures which aimed to avoid 
                                                           
20 On Dworkin’s theory of the objectivity of morality see, R Dworkin, ‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better 
Believe It’ (1996) 25 Philosophy & Public Affairs 87. 
21 In any case this seems to be Dworkin’s position in Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986). 
Whether or not this was already his position in Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1978) 
is a different matter which need not concern us here.  
22 As mentioned in n 19 above, Raz questions whether ‘law as integrity’ amounts to a theory of global 
coherence in law. For the purpose of this article, the details of this issue need not concern us. Bengoetxea 
explicitly understands ‘law as integrity’ as a theory of global coherence in law. The incompatibility of 
Dworkin’s theory of law and the CJEU’s case-law does not depend on whether the former is committed to 
global coherence or not, but rather depends on the question of whether according to the CJEU’s case-law, 
morality is a necessary or even sufficient condition for legal validity.     




precisely such jurisdictional clashes, the CJEU required specific guarantees in the EU 
accession agreement with regard to the Court’s exclusive competence to interpret EU law  
and its scope.24 The Court also demanded a specific clause excluding ECtHR jurisdiction 
to review EU acts in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), for 
the sole reason that the CJEU also lacks jurisdiction in CFSP matters.25 Thirdly, the Court 
argued that the draft accession agreement violated Article 344 TFEU, according to which 
the Member States may not submit a dispute pertaining to the interpretation of the Treaties 
to any method of settlement other than those provided therein.26 Most crucially, however, 
were the Court’s concerns regarding the negative consequences of EU accession under 
the current draft accession agreement for the special characteristics and the autonomy of 
EU law, in particular the principles of supremacy,27 mutual trust,28 and the preliminary 
reference procedure.29 The absolute supremacy of EU law, in particular in the context of 
mutual trust among Member States, would be compromised without specific guarantees 
that EU accession to the ECHR will not entail ECtHR review of the primacy of EU law 
over conflicting national law. In the context of the preliminary reference procedure, the 
Court observed that the new Protocol 16 to the ECHR, which allows the highest courts of 
Member States to request an advisory opinion from the ECtHR on questions of principle 
relating to the interpretation of the ECHR, could be used to circumvent the preliminary 
reference procedure in EU law, thus threatening the latter’s autonomy and effectiveness.30 
It is clear that the plentiful references in Opinion 2/13 to the foundational 
jurisprudence of the EU legal system are consistent with the core of Bengoetxea’s 
                                                           
24 Opinion 2/13 (n 1) paras 215–248. 
25 ibid paras 236–248. 
26 ibid paras 201–214. 
27 ibid paras 187–190.  
28 ibid paras 191–195. The principle of mutual trust has a specific definition in EU law: ‘That principle 
requires, particularly with regard to the [AFSJ], each of the [Member] States, save in exceptional 
circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with 
the fundamental rights recognized by EU law’ (191). 
29 ibid paras 196–200.  




metaphor – the creation of a single coherent body of case-law.31 Moreover, while some 
of the Court’s concerns regarding the autonomy of the legal system seem far-fetched, 
Opinion 2/13 contains little new law; it is mostly a plain application of the principles 
already established in decisions such as Costa v ENEL and Opinion 2/94.32  
However, in a broader sense the metaphor fails to deliver. As regards the prior 
involvement procedure, the co-respondent mechanism, Article 344 TFEU and judicial 
jurisdiction over CFSP matters, the Court’s concerns are institutional in nature, in that 
they relate to the question of who decides what the law of the EU is. The Opinion can 
thus be said to protect the CJEU’s judicial authority. The protection of the so-called 
‘specific characteristics of EU law’ in turn aims to protect the supremacy of systemic 
elements of EU law. Here the Opinion protects the authority of the EU legal system itself. 
The focus on authority is in both cases fundamentally incompatible with Dworkin’s non-
positivism, which is based on the idea that no one – no institution nor any system – may 
decide what the law is, because what the law requires is ultimately governed by objective, 
mind-independent morality.33  
As George Letsas notes, from a non-positivist perspective, doctrines such as the 
supremacy and autonomy of EU law and the authoritativeness of the CJEU can never in 
themselves justify the force of EU law (or of any other).34 These institutional concerns 
are only justified insofar as they remain necessary for the morally justified goals they 
serve – furthering European integration for the peace and prosperity of the peoples of 
Europe. This means, for example, that in light of the constitutional principles of the 
European Union – as reflected most notably in Part I of the TFEU – in particular Article 
2 – and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) – the prior existence of a certain 
                                                           
31 eg, in para 157: ‘As the Court of Justice has repeatedly held, the founding treaties of the EU, unlike 
ordinary international treaties, established a new legal order […] (see, in particular, judgments in van Gend 
& Loos, 26/62, EU:C:1963:1, p. 12, and Costa, 6/64, EU:C:1964:66, p. 593, and Opinion 1/09, 
EU:C:2011:123, paragraph 65)’, and similarly in paras 166 and 176. 
32 Opinion 2/94 on accession by the Community to the ECHR, EU:C:1996:140. See also Kochenov (n 2) 
94. 
33 See Dworkin (n 20); and Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press 2011) ch 19. See also G Letsas, 
‘Harmonic Law’ in J Dickson and P Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union 
Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 107. 




degree of European integration can mean that national fundamental rights protection 
trumps absolute supremacy. Maintaining absolute supremacy may no longer be necessary 
to ensure an already high degree of European integration, as the protection of fundamental 
rights to the detriment of supremacy can be more coherent with the EU’s constitutional 
principles and its very raison d’être.35 This demonstrates that integrity goes beyond 
consistency of judicial decision-making; it is about consistency of principle, and the EU’s 
principles are best identified by the founding values and principles enshrined in the 
Treaties. For a Dworkinian court, therefore, a high degree of legal integration might 
require overturning Costa v ENEL insofar as is needed to make the acquis as a whole 
more coherent. 
Whether the Union at present has reached a sufficient degree of legal and political 
integration to limit supremacy is a question which can only be answered by attributing 
weight to at least the following parameters: an authoritative and uniform application of 
EU law and its instrumental value in pursuing the objectives of European integration; the 
degree of European integration already achieved; the importance of fundamental rights 
protection in European integration; and the importance of the other principles and values 
of the EU acquis pertaining to the objectives of European integration, such as the 
fundamental freedoms of the internal market and the principles of mutual trust and 
recognition. Imagining that the CJEU were as capable as Dworkin’s mythological judge 
Hercules and were able to weigh all these parameters, it would then be in a position to 
quantify the effects of EU accession to the ECHR. It would consider the added value of 
EU’s accession to the ECHR to protecting fundamental rights in Europe, and the possible 
negative consequences of EU accession for the other principles and values of the EU. It 
would also have to calculate the consequences of the relevant counterfactual, ie non-
accession. Even then the Dworkinian court would not have found its one right answer, 
because after identifying the consequences of accession and non-accession for the various 
parameters of European integration, it would have to take all these considerations together 
and decide which legal answer to the question asked in Opinion 2/13 is most coherent 
                                                           




with the entire EU law community of principle. While Dworkin demands tremendous 
effort from courts,36 all Dworkinian courts should at least try to live up to his ideal.37  
What makes Opinion 2/13 anti-Dworkinian is thus not so much the outcome but the 
Court’s reasons for reaching it. Throughout the Opinion, no serious attempt to weigh the 
positive and negative implications of accession and non-accession for fundamental rights 
protection can be found, and nowhere does the Court evaluate these implications in light 
of the general scheme of principle of EU law. From a Dworkinian perspective, the most 
disturbing part of the Opinion is not even that the draft accession agreement was rejected, 
but rather the ‘no, unless...’ tone of the Court, in which it strongly differed with the View 
of Advocate General Kokott, who despite sharing some of the Court’s concerns, applied 
a more constructive approach which resulted in a ‘yes, provided that...’ conclusion.38 A 
genuinely Dworkinian CJEU committed to EU law as integrity would at least have found 
no difficulty in allowing more leeway for future accession. However, the Opinion offers 
no prospect of compromise, dialogue or inter-systemic balance, and no reflection upon 
the moral virtues of accession. It maintains that any harm to the supremacy of EU law 
and the functioning of mutual trust violates the Treaties, notwithstanding any significant 
benefit for fundamental rights protection in the EU. In other words, in assessing the 
validity of the draft accession agreement under EU law, moral judgment plays no role 
whatsoever, not even as a potential justification of an absolute supremacy claim.39   
In contrast, the academic consensus after Opinion 2/13 – even among those who have 
expressed considerable sympathy for the Court’s concerns40 – is that the harm to 
supremacy and mutual trust that the draft accession agreement would have entailed is 
minor if not insignificant in comparison to the importance of enhanced fundamental rights 
protection and external control by the Strasbourg Court. The Court’s critics all apply 
                                                           
36 See also S Shapiro, Legality (Harvard University Press 2011) 284–306. 
37 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 21) 254–258. 
38 See Opinion 2/13, View of AG Kokott, EU:C:2014:2475. 
39 One could argue that the supremacy of EU law over national law is morally justified, for example 
because it contributes to the moral objectives of the project of European integration. The CJEU, however, 
had no recourse to any arguments of such kind. 




variants of this profoundly Dworkinian legal reasoning. Apparently, we are all 
Dworkinians now, with the remarkable exception of the Court of Justice. 
 
3. The Construction of the EU Legal System  
 
If the CJEU is not or no longer a Dworkinian court, what kind of court is it? How can its 
self-referentiality and precedent-focused case-law be explained? A possible answer can 
be found in the theories Dworkin aimed to refute, in particular that of HLA Hart and his 
followers.41 Contrary to Dworkin’s morally grounded theory of law, Hart and his 
followers conceptualise law as a species of a social system which is founded on the social 
practice of institutionalised officials. The social rule which these officials practise 
identifies the criteria of validity of legal norms which they are required to apply, and was 
famously referred to by Hart as the Rule of Recognition. Thus, contrary to Dworkin, Hart 
and his followers describe a content-independent conception of the systematicity of law,42 
at bottom rooted in the thesis that whether a norm is legally valid depends on its source, 
not on its merits.43 
As clearly not all social, normative systems consisting of primary and secondary rules 
are legal systems, Hart’s conception of law appears over-inclusive.44 A key aspect of the 
nature of law, one could say, is thus the factors which distinguish legal systems from 
other social, normative systems comprising primary and secondary norms as well. The 
most influential account of the necessary conditions for the existence of a legal system is 
                                                           
41 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd edn (first published 1961, Clarendon Press 1998). For Dworkin’s 
critique of Hart, see eg, ‘The Model of Rules I’, ‘The Model of Rules II’, and ‘Hard Cases’, all collected in 
Taking Rights Seriously (n 21); and ‘Thirty Years On’ (2002) 115 Harvard Law Review 1655. 
42 I am thankful to the anonymous referee who raised the point of the different conceptions of the 
‘systematicity’ of law. 
43 See Gardner, ‘Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths’ (2001) 46 American Journal of Jurisprudence 199.  
44 Recognising that legal systems are only one form of socially constructed and institutionalised normative 
systems, and arguably not always the most important one in the guidance of people’s lives, lies at the basis 
of the initial pluralist theories of law. See eg, J Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ (1986) 18 Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1; BZ Tamanaha, ‘Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, 
Local to Global’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 375; and W Twining, ‘Normative and Legal Pluralism: A 




the one provided by Joseph Raz. According to Raz, legal systems are social, normative 
systems which (1) are comprehensive, (2) claim supremacy, and (3) are open systems.45  
Legal systems are comprehensiveness in the sense that they claim to regulate any 
type of human behaviour.46 Secondly, legal systems claim supremacy in the sense that 
they claim authority over any other normative arrangements within their jurisdiction.47 In 
other words, they claim legitimate authority.48 Thirdly, legal systems include norms 
which have the purpose of giving binding effect to extra-legal norms, such as the rules of 
private international law which sometimes require courts in one jurisdiction to apply the 
law of another jurisdiction. However, no one would say that a British judge who is 
required to apply French law in a private dispute incorporates French law into the UK 
legal system.   
For the purpose of this article, I take Raz’s theory of the legal system to be largely 
accurate. As I cannot engage here in detail with the relevant philosophical debate, I will 
confine myself to the following remarks. Firstly, I agree with Scott Shapiro that there is 
a necessary connection between law and a claim of supremacy under the assumption that 
law as we know it is a functional social system.49 Whether law claims supremacy in an 
absolute, exclusionary manner, as typically denied by inclusive legal positivists,50 is not 
                                                           
45 J Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Princeton University Press 1990) 151–154. 
46 ibid 150–151. 
47 ibid 151–152. 
48 In Practical Reason and Norms, Raz seems to use ‘claiming supremacy’ and ‘claiming authority’ as 
synonyms, eg: ‘legal systems claim to be supreme […] means that every legal system claims authority to 
prohibit, permit or impose conditions on the institution and operation of all the normative organizations to 
which members of its subject-community belong’ (ibid 151) and ‘[no legal system] can acknowledge any 
claim to supremacy over the same community which may be made by another legal system’ (ibid 152). In 
his later works, most notably The Authority of Law (Clarendon Press 1979) and ‘Authority, Law and 
Morality’ (1985) 68 Monist 295, Raz offers a more sophisticated and elaborate theory of the claims of 
law, focused on the conceptual connection between law and the claim of legitimate authority. While I 
understand the claim to legitimate authority to be a further refinement of what Raz first called a claim to 
be supreme, the complexities of this refinement are not directly relevant here, and I will refer to the claim 
to supremacy in the remainder of this article. 
49 S Shapiro, ‘On Hart’s Way Out’ in JL Coleman (ed), Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to ‘The 
Concept of Law’ (Oxford University Press 2001). 




directly relevant for the purpose of this article insofar as one believes, as I do, that law 
claims supremacy at least to a significant extent. Secondly, in this regard one could say 
that the more functional and goal-driven a legal system is, the more important it is for that 
legal system to claim supremacy. From this perspective, the EU seems to fit Raz’s theory 
of the legal system particularly well because it is by its nature a highly functional system. 
Unlike national legal systems, the EU has an explicitly purposive nature in light of its 
specific policy objectives and limited competences. Thirdly, I emphasise ‘law as we know 
it’ because I am not entirely convinced that law necessarily claims supremacy, and I 
certainly do not want to defend this thesis here. Recent works in legal philosophy have 
strongly argued in favour of a more realistic theory of law and typical, rather than 
necessary, conditions of law.51 Tentatively agreeing with Tuori, legal solipsism might not 
be inevitable in law.52 However, I do believe that the concept of law as we know it, and 
which is strongly linked to characteristics of national legal systems, includes a claim to 
supremacy, and that EU law is no different in this respect.53 
 Moving on to the other two conditions, comprehensiveness and openness can be 
conceived as ‘generatives’ for the claim to supremacy, rather than independent conditions 
in themselves. Comprehensiveness allows the legal system to genuinely claim absolute 
supremacy over other normative arrangements independent of their content. The 
openness of the legal system allows it to develop continuously without losing its 
capability to claim supremacy, through the process of delegating the task of determining 
what the law is to courts by giving them legally binding directions to engage in extra-
legal reasoning. 
In the following sections, I will argue that the CJEU has attempted to meet Raz’s 
necessary conditions of legal systems in its jurisprudence on the protection of what the 
Court calls the ‘specific characteristics of EU law’: autonomy, direct effect and 
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Law (Cambridge University Press 2017). 
52 K Tuori, European Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2015) 86. 




supremacy. As will be shown, however, none of these characteristics are EU-specific. 
Rather, what is protected is the legality, ie the status of law,54 of EU law. 
 
A. The emergence of the (embryonic?) EU legal system  
It is often asserted that EU ‘law’ is not really law, or at least not in the same way that 
national legal systems are law.55 Instead, because of its less sophisticated, less 
comprehensive and less institutionalised structure, EU law is a form of international 
law,56 something ‘sui generis’,57 or a more loosely defined ‘order’.58  
                                                           
54 The concept of ‘legality’ is often used in different ways. In the Kantian sense, ‘legality’ means mere 
compliance with law, deprived of any moral endorsement of the law or other reasons for conforming to it. 
In this sense, legality is contrasted with morality: ‘The agreement of an action with the law of duty is its 
legality [Gesetzmässigkeit] (legalitas); the agreement of the maxim of the action with the law is its morality 
[Sittlichkeit] (moralitas)’ (emphasis in original) (I Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice. Part I of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, 2nd edn, trans J Ladd (Hackett Publishing 1999) 19). By contrast, following the 
modern legal positivist tradition, here ‘legality’ is meant as ‘the property of being law’. The legality of a 
normative system depends on whether it possesses the necessary and sufficient conditions for being ‘law’. 
See also Coleman, The Practice of Principle (Oxford University Press 2003) 84; and Shapiro (n 36) 7. 
55 See eg, K Culver and M Giudice, ‘Not a System but an Order’ in J Dickson and P Eleftheriadis (eds), 
Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2012); A Somek, ‘Is Legality 
a Principle of EU Law?’ in S Vogenauer and S Weatherill (eds), General Principles of Law. European and 
Comparative Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2017).  
56 T Moorhead, ‘European Union Law as International Law’ (2012) 5 EJLS 126. 
57 See eg, JHH Weiler, ‘Federalism without Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg’ in K Nicolaidis and 
R Howse (eds), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the 
European Union (Oxford University Press 2001); B de Witte, ‘The European Union as International Legal 
Experiment’ in G de Búrca and JHH Weiler (eds), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (Cambridge 
University Press 2012). 
58 As applied to law, I consider the distinction between ‘system’ and ‘order’ to be largely superfluous. 
Bengoetxea observes that a ‘system’ in the strict sense may be understood as having the properties 
completeness, closed, and consistent – unlike the looser connotation of ‘order’. Legal systems/orders 
arguably do not possess these properties, and at most claim to possess them or aspire towards possessing 
them (eg, J Bengoetxea, ‘Legal System as a Regulative Ideal’ in H-J Koch and U Neumann (eds), 
Praktische Vernunft und Rechtsanwendung (Franz Steiner 1994)). In a weaker sense, ‘system’ can refer to 
a set of related elements which has a certain internal structure and can be distinguished from its environment 
(see eg, M van de Kerchove and F Ost, Legal System. Between Order and Disorder, trans I Stewart (Oxford 




However, Hart’s social constructivist theory of law perhaps provides the most 
persuasive intellectual support for the famous statement that the Treaty of Rome 
‘constitutes a new legal order of international law’,59 and that it ‘has created its own legal 
system’ bringing into existence ‘an independent source of law’.60 If law is a social 
construct primarily rooted in the behaviour of a particular group of people, it can emerge 
spontaneously. Certainly, according to Hart and his followers, something cannot be law 
if it is not generally obeyed by its subjects,61 but this only means that efficacy is a conditio 
sine qua non for a legal system to exist, and by no means a conditio per quam for it to 
emerge.62 
It also follows from Hart’s social constructivism, however, that a legal system cannot 
be created top-down ex nihilo. Given the existing institutional infrastructure of the 
national legal systems, the only group of people designated as ‘officials’ who could 
realistically establish a new legal system in Europe is the judiciary of the Member States. 
If EU law is to be a directly effective legal system in the Member States’ legal-
institutional arena, clearly the practice of the national courts must establish a social rule 
to that end. In this perspective, the rationale of van Gend & Loos, to empower national 
courts to apply provisions of EU law, is indeed a foundational strategy.63 It marks the 
shift from a-legality to the possibility of legality by creating the necessary institutional 
conditions for the emergence of legal system.64 The word ‘possibility’ is key: van Gend 
& Loos was at most the prophecy of a legal system, ‘an invitation to the Member State 
                                                           
conception of ‘system’, if only because of their openness, and as such the term can be used interchangeably 
with ‘legal order’. Moreover, while some legal systems have a higher degree of (mainly institutional) 
systematicity than others, I see no reason to make a distinction between ‘systems’ and ‘orders’ on the basis 
of sophistication alone.  
59 Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Nederlandse 
administratie der belastingen, EU:C:1963:1. 
60 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL, EU:C:1964:66, para 3. 
61 Hart (n 41) 116–117; Raz, The Concept of a Legal System (Clarendon Press) 202–207. 
62 H Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans A Wedberg (Harvard University Press 1945) 119. In 
the same vein, though applying different terminology, Hart (n 41) 103–104; and Raz (n 61) 202–204.  
63 See in this regard also JHH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 YLJ 2403; R Dehousse, 
The European Court of Justice: The Politics of Judicial Integration (Palgrave Macmillan 1998). 
64 On the shift from a-legality to legality, see H Lindahl, Fault-Lines of Globalisation: Legal Order and the 




courts’ in the words of Weiler,65 or a ‘juridical coupe d’État’ in those of Stone Sweet.66 
Had no national court heeded the Court’s invitation, there would certainly not have been 
an autonomous EU legal system. If there has indeed been a juridical coup d’État altering 
the Rules of Recognition in the EU Member States, it could only have been achieved 
through the institutional infrastructure capable of establishing a new Rule of Recognition 
– the national courts, not the CJEU. But if this is the case, there is no difference in how 
any legal system comes into being 
An autonomous EU Rule of Recognition must not be conflated with any written norm 
in the Treaties, contrary to President Koen Lenaerts’s statement that the ‘ultimate Rule of 
Recognition [of the European Union], to speak with HLA Hart, are the Treaties: on the 
European Union [sic], on the Functioning of the European Union, and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’.67 This is a misunderstanding of Hart’s notion of the Rule of 
Recognition. The Rule of Recognition is not the highest norm or set of norms of the legal 
system, but the social rule that designates this-or-that norm or set of norms as the highest 
source of the legal system.68  
Conceptualising the EU legal system as a social, normative system with an 
autonomous Rule of Recognition, the subsequent question is which distinguishing 
features the EU legal system possesses. The case-law of the CJEU contains myriad 
examples of how the Court constructs EU law along the lines of other legal systems. Put 
together, these examples illustrate how the Court effectively purports to mimic national 
                                                           
65 Weiler (n 63) 2451. 
66 A Stone Sweet, ‘The Juridical Coup d’État and the Problem of Authority: CILFIT and Foto-Frost’ in M 
Poiares Maduro and L Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited 
on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010) 202. 
67 Intervention by President Koen Lenaerts during the ICON 2016 conference (Berlin, 19 June 2016), 
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Vrjbte9Yfg (from 31:54). In full, commenting on the 
relationship between the EU and the ECHR in the context of Opinion 2/13, the President said: ‘The 
European Union is a domestic legal order, domestic to the European Union […] When I say “domestic”, I 
simply mean the European Union as a self-referential legal order whose ultimate Rule of Recognition, to 
speak with HLA Hart, are the Treaties: on the European Union, on the Functioning of the European Union, 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. That is our ultimate constitutional standard, but which is rooted in 
the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, in the ECHR’.  
68 Hart (n 41) 103–110; J Gardner, ‘Can There Be a Written Constitution?’ in J Gardner, Law as a Leap of 




legal systems. From this perspective, otherwise obscure case-law on the 
comprehensiveness, openness, and most notably the supremacy of EU law can be better 
understood. 
 
B. The truism of claiming comprehensive supremacy 
Since Costa v ENEL the Court of Justice has maintained that EU law has absolute 
supremacy over national law.69 Applying the condition of comprehensiveness, the 
supremacy of EU law cannot depend on the subject or the political or legal sensitivity of 
the matter. Following Raz, the law regulates parts of private life that cannot be 
constrained by law by self-declared non-intervention. Similarly, the constitutional 
limitations to ‘pure’ supremacy in reality confirm the supremacy of EU law even in those 
fields. For example, Article 4(2) TEU states that the EU  
 
shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their 
national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. 
 
This Article has been interpreted in the literature as entailing necessary limitations to the 
supremacy of EU law.70 The Court has acknowledged that national identity may be 
relevant in the context of derogations from EU law.71 But this is precisely the point: 
                                                           
69 See eg, Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide 
und Futtermittel, EU:C:1970:114; Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal 
SpA, EU:C:1978:49; Opinion 2/13 (n 1). See further JHH Weiler, ‘The Community System: The Dual 
Character of Supranationalism’ (1981) 1 YEL 267. 
70 See eg, A von Bogdandy and S Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity 
under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 CMLRev 1417; D Leczykiewicz: ‘The “National Identity Clause” in 
the EU Treaty: A Blow to Supremacy of Union Law?’, UK Constitutional Law Association (21 June 2012); 
see further M Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law (Oxford University Press 2014); and G van der 
Schyff, ‘The Constitutional Relationship Between the Union and its Member States: The Role of National 
Identity in Article 4(2) TEU’ (2012) 37 ELRev 563. For an defence of a limited form of supremacy of EU 
law, see MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford University Press 1999) 117–121. 
71 See eg, Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, EU:C:2010:806; Case 
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incorporating the limitations to supremacy into the Treaty and the Court’s case-law 
strengthens the supremacy of EU law, as it is EU law which rules over national identity 
or constitutional tradition by permitting it.  
The Court’s case-law on supremacy has been reinforced recently in both Melloni72 
and Opinion 2/13. The Melloni case dealt with the interpretation of Article 53 CFR, which 
reads: 
 
Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of 
application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to 
which the Union, the Community or all the Member States are party, including the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitutions. 
 
This provision seems to ensure that Member States can apply higher standards of human 
rights than those guaranteed by the Charter, although its text is anything but clear.73 In 
Melloni, the Court had to decide whether the right to a fair trial as safeguarded by Article 
24(2) of the Spanish Constitution could prevail over the provisions of the Arrest Warrant 
Directive.74 The Court answered this question in the negative. It interpreted Article 53 
CFR to mean that the Member States cannot apply higher human rights standards insofar 
as that this would compromise the supremacy and effectiveness of EU law, in this case 
the Arrest Warrant Directive. This interpretation leans heavily on the phrase ‘human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, 
[…] by the Member States’ constitutions’. 
                                                           
72 Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2013:107. 
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about its meaning and scope to guesswork. See eg, J Bering Liisberg, ‘Does the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights Threaten the Supremacy of Community Law?’ (2001) 38 CMLRev 1171; LFM Besselink, ‘The 
Member States, the National Constitutions and the Scope of the Charter’ (2001) 8 MJ 68; R Alonso García, 
‘The General Provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ (2002) 8 ELJ 492. 
74 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
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The Melloni judgment received abundant criticism both for its legal outcome – the 
subordination of a national provision of constitutional law which contained a fundamental 
human right – and the obscure and counterintuitive interpretation of Article 53 CFR.75 
From the perspective of Raz’s theory of the legal system, however, it is a truism to state 
that within the jurisdiction of a particular legal system, only that legal system may be 
supreme. The text of Article 53 CFR in this regard supports such a conclusion, as it 
emphasises on the contrary that the Charter cannot adversely affect human rights 
protection standards in another system’s respective fields of application, including higher 
standards. This interpretation confirms the idea that all legal systems are autonomous in 
their own jurisdiction.  
In other words, whatever is in the scope of, say, Member State law is subject to the 
supremacy of the various national legal systems, and conversely, whatever is in the scope 
of EU law is subject to the supremacy of EU law. The fact that EU law and national law 
continuously interact and are concurrently present in the geographical territories of the 
Member States does not alter this conclusion.76 From a legal systems point of view, we 
could indeed argue that each of the 28 national legal systems and the separate EU legal 
system are autonomous from within their respective perspectives.77 In that regard, it 
makes little sense to ask whether in a given EU Member State, it is the national legal 
system or the EU legal system which is normatively superior. There is nothing in the 
                                                           
75 See eg, LFM Besselink, ‘The Parameters of Constitutional Conflict after Melloni’ (2014) 39 ELRev 531; 
A Torres Pérez, ‘Melloni in Three Acts: From Dialogue to Monologue’ (2014) 10 EuConst 308; N 
Lavranos, ‘The CJEU’s Judgments in Melloni and Akerberg Fransson: Une ménage à trois difficulté’ 
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concept of a legal system that suggests it is constrained to a single geographic area, nor 
that any geographic area can have only one legal system.78  
The same approach to supremacy is unequivocally pursued by the Court in Opinion 
2/13. The Court’s considerations as regards the incompatibility of the draft accession 
agreement and the principle of mutual trust are particularly illuminating in this regard. As 
a consequence of the specific characteristics of EU law, the Court held in its Opinion that 
the draft EU accession agreement threatens the principle of mutual trust, particularly in 
the context of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). Of all the aspects of 
Opinion 2/13, this argument seems to have endured the most severe criticism. Many 
commentators have observed that the Court aims to protect mutual trust to the detriment 
of fundamental rights protection, and therefore hierarchically ranks fundamental rights 
below mutual trust and integration generally.79  
However, what seems particularly crucial to the Court’s reasoning is not the 
substance of the principle of mutual trust as opposed to that of fundamental rights, but the 
fact that mutual trust is a matter within the jurisdiction of EU law: 
 
[T]he Member States have, by reason of their membership of the EU, accepted that 
relations between them as regards the matters covered by the transfer of powers from 
the Member States to the EU are governed by EU law to the exclusion, if EU law so 
requires, of any other law.80 
 
As a matter of EU law as it currently stands, Member States must comply with the 
requirements of mutual trust expressed in secondary legislation. This requirement is a 
logical consequence of the presumption of the legal validity of the Dublin Regulation,81 
which remains warranted until it is successfully challenged for violating higher-order law 
                                                           
78 J Gardner, ‘Fifteen Themes from Law as a Leap of Faith’ (2015) 6 Jurisprudence 601, 605. 
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within the normative scope of the EU legal system. In Kelsenian terms, secondary 
legislation can only be subject to the normativity that is inherent to the ‘pure’ legal 
system.82 The Court repeated in Opinion 2/13 that in conformity with EU law on this 
point, Member States must presume that fundamental rights standards have been 
complied with by other Member States, and may in principle not check whether those 
standards are observed.83  
By contrast, nothing in the Court’s reasoning suggests that the functioning of mutual 
trust is excluded from fundamental rights review. Within the EU legal system, however, 
this entails review of the relevant secondary legislation in light of primary fundamental 
rights law, in particular the Charter, following a specific case or preliminary question to 
that end. Since the Court was not asked for its opinion on the interpretation of the Dublin 
Regulation itself, it should come as no surprise that it did not speak of the compatibility 
of the application of the regulation with fundamental rights. Indeed, in the recent CK and 
Others judgment the Court held that the application of the Dublin Regulation is subject 
to Article 4 CFR.84 While consistent with the ECHR’s MSS jurisprudence,85 which is a 
welcome approach, this judgment does not overturn Opinion 2/13 in this respect at all,86 
as the latter precisely centres on the argument that it is EU law and EU law alone which 
may decide the interpretation of the Dublin Regulation. Given the opportunity to interpret 
the Regulation further, the Court in CK and Others decided to give the Dublin Regulation 
                                                           
82 See on Kelsen’s ‘pure theory of law’, which asserts that the normativity of the law should be explained 
solely in its own terms, generally, H Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck 2008); and Kelsen (n 62). 
83 Opinion 2/13 (n 1), para 192. 
84 Case C-578/16 PPU CK and Others v Republika Slovenija, EU:C:2017:127, para 65: ‘It follows from all 
of the preceding considerations that the transfer of an asylum seeker within the framework of the Dublin 
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85 eg, MSS v Belgium and Greece, App No 30696/09 (GC, 21 January 2011); Tarakhel v Switzerland, App 
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86 cf S Peers, ‘The Dublin system: The ECJ Squares the Circle between Mutual Trust and Human Rights 





the sense that anyone would sensibly presume it has, even though earlier case-law seemed 
to strongly suggest otherwise.87 
Consequently, the Court’s emphasis that mutual trust is governed by EU law to the 
exclusion of any other law leaves untouched the possibility for external review by the 
ECtHR after future accession, if it is EU law which is subject to review – not the Member 
States implementing EU law. The Court effectively does exactly what Halberstam 
suggests as a remedy to ensure future ECHR accession.88  
The relevance of the principle of mutual trust and the Dublin Regulation in Opinion 
2/13 marks the importance of different conceptions of legal validity for the soundness of 
the Opinion. For the Dworkinian, legal validity does not depend on whether there are 
rules, principles or court judgments which affirm the validity of a norm. The legal validity 
of the principle of mutual trust would depend on the question of whether it fits the morally 
best interpretation of the EU’s community of principle. This underlies virtually all 
commentators’ arguments: mutual trust certainly has specific virtues, which are however 
not absolute and the supremacy of EU law cannot justify the moral loss of non-accession 
to the ECHR. The Razian might morally agree with this conclusion, but would dismiss 
the argument as irrelevant from the legal point of view, in which moral reasons are pre-
empted by legal ones.89 
 
                                                           
87 In determining what EU law really requires on this point, the problem with cases such as Joined Cases 
C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department and ME and Others v Refugee 
Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, EU:C:2011:865; Case C-
4/11 Germany v Kaveh Puid, EU:C:2013:740; Case C-394/12 Shamso Abdullahi v Bundesasylamt, 
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the CFR in cases where there is a real risk of violation of Art 4 CFR. See further K Lenaerts, ‘La vie après 
l’avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual (Yet Not Blind) Trust’ (2017) 54 CMLRev 805, 834. However, 
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judgments very frequently read as providing at least partially generalisable rules, both by what they say and 
by what they do not say. 
88 Halberstam (n 2) 145–146. 
89 On Raz’s ‘legal point of view’ as opposed to Hart’s ‘internal point of view’, see W Conklin, The 




C. Total EU law 
One might object that despite its supremacy claim, EU law fails to meet Raz’s conditions 
for the legal system, for it cannot even remotely match or claim the comprehensiveness 
of national law.90 Indeed, one of the major idiosyncrasies of EU law qua law is that it 
only possesses limited competences in the pursuance of specific objectives. However, the 
CJEU has been endeavouring to advance the comprehensiveness of EU law, most notably 
through the doctrine of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz and its case-law on the ‘retained 
powers’ of the Member States. In the words of Loïc Azoulai, the resulting image is that 
of EU law as total law,91 which corresponds to Raz’s notion of comprehensiveness.  
The doctrine of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz holds that while the competences of 
the EU are limited in nature, it is solely for the CJEU to establish whether a particular 
matter falls within the scope of EU law. Since long, the Court itself has held that ‘the 
question of a possible infringement of fundamental rights by a measure of the [EU] 
institutions can only be judged in the light of [EU] law itself’.92 One can infer judicial 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz from the wording of Article 263 TFEU, which grants the CJEU 
the adjudicative jurisdiction to assess the validity of acts of EU institutions and lists ‘lack 
of competence’ as a ground for illegality.93 Moreover, from Article 267 TFEU it can be 
inferred that the CJEU has the exclusive jurisdiction to invalidate acts of EU institutions.94  
Secondly, beyond the express and implied powers of the EU, the CJEU has rejected 
the existence of domains reserved to national sovereignty. According to the ‘retained 
powers formula’,95 the Court has consistently maintained that while EU law does not 
detract from certain retained powers of the Member States, for example education, direct 
taxation, the organisation of their social security systems, and the conferral and 
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withdrawal of nationality, ‘when exercising those powers, the Member States must 
comply with EU law’.96 To put it more directly, under EU law, ‘there simply is no nucleus 
of sovereignty that the Member States can invoke, as such, against the [EU]’.97 Hence 
comprehensiveness of EU law lies not so much in its policy powers, but in the unlimited 
field of application of its law within its jurisdiction. In this regard, the EU legal system is 
similar to national legal systems in that the latter’s jurisdiction is also constrained, at least 
geographically and temporally. Consequently, the criterion of comprehensiveness does 
not necessarily mean that law claims unlimited jurisdiction.98 Rather, law appears to claim 
an unspecified jurisdiction, always claiming authority for itself,99 and refusing to 
acknowledge any limit on their jurisdiction.100 This is precisely what EU law claims 
through both the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz and the retained powers formula. 
The Court’s effort to totalise EU law is further illustrated with the case-law on the 
application of the free movement provisions. In Omega Spielhallen101 the Court held that 
the law of the internal market applied to the German prohibition of laser tag games. 
Notwithstanding the marginal assessment of the necessity and proportionality of national 
law, it is clear that within the scope of EU law, every sphere of human behaviour is 
regulated by the fundamental freedoms of the internal market. The fact that it is the Court 
of Justice which decides to apply a marginal balancing test between economic freedoms 
and human rights is arguably of far greater constitutional importance than the deferential 
nature of the test itself. Secondly, the total law approach is further supported by the broad 
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Gouvernement de la Communauté française, EU:C:2010:181, para 28; Joined Cases C-11/06 and C-12/06 
Rhiannon Morgan v Bezirksregierung Köln and Iris Bucher v Landrat des Kreises Düren, EU:C:2007:626, 
para 24; as to direct taxation see eg, Case C-279/93 Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Roland Schumacker, 
EU:C:1995:31, para 21; as to social security eg, Case 238/82 Duphar BV and Others v Netherlands, 
EU:C:1984:45, para 16; as to nationality eg, Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, 
EU:C:2010:104, para 45. 
97 K Lenaerts, ‘Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism’ (1990) 38 AJCL 205, 220. 
98 TAO Endicott, ‘Interpretation, Jurisdiction, and the Authority of Law’ (2007) 6 APA Newsletter 14. 
99 J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press 1986) 77. 
100 Endicott (n 98) 18. 
101 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der 




and purposive interpretation of key concepts of EU law in a way which maximises their 
effet utile, most notably the Dassonville rule for identifying measures having equivalent 
effect to quantitative import restrictions,102 which has effectively been transplanted to the 
other fundamental freedoms.103 In the Tobacco Advertising cases, this broad definition of 
obstacles to trade has also been applied to the EU’s competence to harmonise 
legislation.104  
The doctrine of total EU law and the manner in which the Court maintains the claim 
to comprehensive supremacy illustrate how the criteria of comprehensiveness and 
supremacy and interrelated in a specific way. Rather than a fully separate criterion in 
itself, comprehensiveness can be seen as a generative for the maintenance of the 
supremacy claim. The total law doctrine of the CJEU reflects a typical claim of legal 
systems in general, perhaps even revealing a truism about law: law is always total law. 
 
D. …because we say so 
Like any national legal system, EU law contains many norms which give binding force 
to norms which are themselves not part of EU law. As regards the adoption of norms 
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created by individuals to arrange their private affairs – contracts, private regulation etc – 
EU law does not behave any differently from other legal systems. The interaction between 
the EU legal system on the one hand, and national and international legal systems on the 
other, deserves some further scrutiny.  
In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft,105 the CJEU famously introduced unwritten 
EU fundamental rights which it derived from the common constitutional traditions of the 
Member States, in order to shield the supremacy of EU law from the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s critique.106 Currently, fundamental rights are both part of the 
general principles of EU law and enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Nevertheless, neither the constitutional traditions of the Member States nor the ECHR are 
actually incorporated into the EU legal system. Article 6(3) TEU carefully declares that  
 
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the 
Union’s law.107 
 
This Article ensures that the autonomy of EU law is protected against external norms by 
copying the rights referred to into EU law, rather than incorporating them.108 Therefore, 
the Court is able to deny that the Convention itself is a source of EU law. At most, when 
interpreting and applying EU fundamental rights, EU law directs courts to engage in 
ECHR-inspired legal reasoning in accordance with EU law. Similarly, but more 
specifically, Article 52(3) CFR states that the rights in the Charter which correspond with 
ECHR rights, should have the same meaning and scope as those laid down by the ECHR. 
Article 52(3) CFR can thus be said to provide an interpretative direction.  
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The key difference between giving binding effect to the rights enshrined in the ECHR 
in order to further develop the fundamental rights of EU law, and the incorporation of 
such rights in the EU legal system itself, is that in the first case the CJEU merely uses 
sources exogenous to the legal system to shape EU law in accordance with existing norms. 
It follows that EU law remains capable of claiming supremacy. In contrast, were the rights 
of the ECHR to be fully incorporated into the EU legal system, this new part of EU law 
would in effect be subject to the interpretation of the Strasbourg Court. The price for this 
distinction is widespread confusion about the ultimate source of legitimate legal 
interpretation within the EU, which suffocates the law’s ability to claim supremacy. 
In other words, the openness of the EU legal system in conjunction with its claim to 
comprehensive supremacy is given by the formula ‘…because we say so’. There can be 
no doubt that EU law – and its interpretation by the CJEU – is influenced both by the 
national legal systems and by the ECHR. From a legal-sociological perspective, the CJEU 
must operate not only within boundaries of legality, but is also bound by a wider range of 
steadying factors,109 which include politico-judicial legitimacy.110 However, the claims 
of the CJEU are immune to extra-legal influences precisely because the Court also claims 
that EU law is what the Court says it is. Also here one can see why the CJEU, when it 
really matters, does not behave like a Dworkinian court. When it is confronted with 
sufficiently strong extra-legal force – which can be pressure from other jurisdictions 
including the ECtHR, but also insights from particular schools of economics,111 or simply 
pragmatic considerations112 – the Court typically has little trouble in effectively departing 
from its own case-law to avoid conflict, albeit without ever admitting that it succumbs to 
outside pressure. Rhetorical devices are plentiful for the creative court: from the infamous 
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‘clarifying the case-law’ argument in Keck and Mithouard113 and more recently in Intel,114 
to suddenly discovering new, unwritten principles in EU law itself (which, unsurprisingly, 
are identical to the common constitutional traditions of the Member States) in 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, or similar carrot-and-stick strategies such as denying 
that national constitutional law can escape the supremacy of EU free movement law while 
simultaneously applying a marginal proportionality assessment in politically or ethically 
sensitive cases (Omega Spielhallen). And of course, there is always the option of denying 
that there has ever been a conflict at all, as seems to happen in Aranyosi and Căldăraru 
and CK and Others, where the CJEU silently re-interprets its NS case-law and the Charter 
to accommodate the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.115  
In summary, it is the openness of the legal system that allows for the maintenance of 
the supremacy claim. The self-referentiality of the CJEU’s case-law can be explained by 
the fact that norms of the EU legal system derive their validity exclusively from their 
source, which is a corollary of EU law’s claim to absolute supremacy.116 More 
specifically, legal propositions of the EU legal system must either be derived from the 
Treaties or secondary legislation, or in what could be called ‘hard cases’, be derived from 
the CJEU’s support of this proposition as a proposition of EU law. The implicit 
endorsement of the ‘sources thesis’ by the CJEU not only explains its self-referential 
tendencies. It also explains how the Court finds no trouble in not following its own case-
law when it deems a departure necessary to avoid conflict with other jurisdictions. After 
all, in hard cases it is the Court who decides what the law says,117 and absent many 
constraints on its own authority outside some degree of predictability and sanity, the 
Court can change its mind.118 
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4. Mimesis, Solipsism, and Pluralism 
 
A. The EU legal system and national legal systems 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Opinion 2/13 is its assertion that the draft 
accession agreement violates characteristics specific to the EU: 
 
The approach adopted in the agreement envisaged, which is to treat the EU as a State 
[…] disregards the intrinsic nature of the EU.119 
 
This assertion is puzzling, given that the Court’s concerns appear very similar to concerns 
of autonomy and supremacy typically expressed by national constitutional courts.120 
Moreover, since the essential point is EU law’s claim to supremacy in matters within its 
jurisdiction, this can be regarded as a claim inherent to law. In other words, while the 
Court indeed perceives EU law as a legal system throughout its Opinion, the Court’s focus 
on the ‘intrinsic nature of the EU’ and its supposed idiosyncracy leads it to a profoundly 
mistaken argument for a truistic conclusion. The actual problem does not seem to be that 
the draft accession agreement treats the EU as a State, but that it treats the EU legal system 
as different from a national legal system.  
This brings me to a potential explanation of the Court’s conception of EU law. Surely 
this does not root in the personal philosophical positions of the members of the Court. 
Although it cannot be excluded that some members would endorse Raz’s theory of legal 
systems, such speculation cannot warrant attributing these premises to the CJEU as a 
whole. More importantly, doctrines like the supremacy of EU law predate Raz’s writings 
by several years. Neither am I convinced that the CJEU must do what it does simply by 
virtue of being a court in law because the characteristics of legal systems as Raz identified 
them are ‘necessary conditions’ for law.121 Leaving aside the question of whether 
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necessary conditions for law exist and whether Raz’s theory of legal systems succeeds in 
providing conceptual truths about law,122 there is nothing in the Treaties that forces the 
Court to shape the EU alongside the conceptual lines of what constitutes a legal system. 
It has been the CJEU’s jurisprudence which transformed the EU into an EU legal system, 
not the EU legal system which forced the CJEU to acknowledge its existence as such.123 
Accordingly, connection between the CJEU’s case-law and Raz’s theory of the legal 
system is neither psychological nor conceptual. Instead, the CJEU’s conception of the EU 
legal system and its self-understanding can be linked to its attempt to model EU law after 
the national legal systems, ie to give it those characteristics that (1) national legal systems 
also have, and (2) which arguably characterise the latter as law. While Raz’s theory of 
law purports to be universal, the state is of particular importance for his legal philosophy: 
‘State law was special in the past and is likely to remain special in the future, because it 
is likely to remain the most comprehensive law-based social organisation’, and so while 
‘exclusive concentration on state law was, it now turns out, never justified, and is even 
less justified today’, state legal systems can be regarded as paradigm instances of law as 
we understand the concept of law.124 It is certainly true that in the past decades, legal 
theory has become far less state-focused than it used to be, both because of the increasing 
importance of transnational legal systems and due to the insights of legal pluralism. 
However, both in terms of the comprehensiveness of their claims and their entrenched 
social legitimacy, national legal systems stand out in many aspects, and this was certainly 
the case in the 1960s and 1970s when the CJEU laid the foundations of what it nowadays 
calls the ‘specific characteristics of EU law’.  
Accordingly, the CJEU’s conception of the EU legal system is perhaps best explained 
as originating in the Court’s effort to construct a legal system along the lines of national 
legal systems, mimicking them to the fullest possible extent. The necessary link between 
the Court’s shaping of the EU legal system Raz’s theory of legal systems is then given by 
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the concept of imitation or mimesis. Agreeing with Robert Schütze, the mythology of the 
EU’s ‘sui generis’ nature was already under siege, as European constitutionalism has 
come to acknowledge the idea of the EU being a ‘federation of states’.125 Adding to the 
constitutional perspective, in which the ‘normative ambivalence surrounding supremacy 
and sovereignty can better be viewed as part of the parcel of the European Union’s federal 
nature’,126 also from a legal-philosophical viewpoint, the EU legal system is perhaps not 
at all that different from national law, at least not in its claims and self-conception.127 
By analogy, it is inconceivable that any federal constitutional court would allow the 
ECHR to disturb the constitutional relations between the federal level and its subparts. 
Indeed, EU accession is unique to the extent that both the EU and the Member States 
would become Contracting Parties. However, this is only a factual peculiarity as a result 
of the complex political and legal interactions between the EU and the Member States. It 
has nothing to do with the characteristics of the EU legal system in itself. The only reason 
why the concerns of the CJEU should be assessed differently from those of any other 
constitutional court is a political one: the EU cannot claim the political sovereignty that 
States claim to possess. Consequently, the conceptual resemblance of the EU law and 
national law is directly linked to the dissociation between the EU’s political and legal 
nature. The thesis that the EU legal system is mimetic of national legal systems can be 
maintained notwithstanding the fact that politically the EU is undeniably an entity distinct 
from the modern nation state. 
A second objection to the mimetic nature of the EU legal system is the following.128 
There is a structural duality in the creation and application of EU law. For example, 
pursuant to the ordinary and special legislative procedures,129 EU legal norms are created 
by nationally elected Ministers in the Council together with the European Parliament. 
These institutions respectively represent European individuals both as nationals of a 
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Member State130 and as citizens of the EU.131 This inherent duality also permeates the 
law-applying institutions. As mentioned above, national courts are quintessential part of 
the institutional infrastructure that upholds the EU legal system, while they distinguish 
themselves as adjudicative institutions by virtue of national secondary legal norms. This 
paradoxical role of national courts brings an additional dimension to the chicken-and-egg 
problem of how law can emerge.132 However, it is at the very least arguably the case that, 
perhaps contra the self-perception of many national courts, when national courts apply 
EU law they are actually functioning as courts of the EU legal system as opposed to their 
national legal system.133 Nothing in the concept of a legal system resists the thesis that 
multiple legal systems are applied concurrently, even by the same officials. Moreover, 
the idea that national courts are wearing two hats certainly seems to be the position of the 
CJEU in its Simmenthal judgment, which obligates national courts directly to apply EU 
law, turning national courts into decentralised EU courts within the EU legal system.134 
Whether the social practice of national courts supports the existence of an 
autonomous EU norm of adjudication as applied to them is an empirical question, as is 
the question of whether an autonomous EU Rule of Recognition is practised by national 
courts. However, the dual hats of national courts as such do not threaten the CJEU’s 
conceptualisation of the EU legal system as being no different from the national legal 
systems. 
 
B. The pluralist challenge 
If law indeed claims comprehensive supremacy, this would mean that all legal systems 
are necessarily highly solipsistic,135 transforming legal analysis into an exercise in 
‘Ptolemaic jurisprudence’, to use Dworkin’s pejorative assessment.136 Notwithstanding 
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that this might indeed be considered a disturbing feature of law, such an evaluative 
perspective does not invalidate the analytical value of the thesis itself, nor its 
manifestation in the CJEU’s jurisprudence. However, Raz’s theory of the necessary 
conditions of legal systems has not been particularly fashionable in recent years, also 
from an analytical perspective. Theories of legal pluralism, for all the differences between 
them, all seem to presume that the legal landscape – and the landscape of normative 
systems affecting human life more generally – is not adequately covered by the state-
centred theories of law.137  
In the context of the European legal space and the relationship between EU law, the 
ECHR and the national legal systems, legal pluralism has manifested itself as the foremost 
challenger of authority-based theories of law. Constitutional pluralism, which can be 
roughly defined as an application of legal pluralism theories to theorise the constitutional 
structure of the European legal space, remains particularly popular, both as a descriptive 
theory138 and as a normative theory endorsing the need for inter-system harmony and 
judicial dialogue.139 Constitutional pluralism and other variants of legal pluralism do raise 
the question of whether ‘traditional’ legal philosophy should be amended to include the 
increasingly transnational character of law. Since the present article portrays the CJEU as 
a court strongly committed to Raz’s theory of the legal system, it is likewise affected by 
the pluralism movement insofar as the latter might claim that Raz’s allegedly state-
centred theory140 of law is obsolete in general. 
However, while pluralist theories of law can be applied to the normative question of 
how to shape constitutionalism in the undisputedly pluriform European legal space, I 
would argue that they generally add little to the philosophical debate on the properties of 
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law.141 Purely descriptive variants of legal pluralism which confine themselves to 
observing that the ultimate supremacy question is redundant because state and other legal 
systems have equally legitimate claims to supremacy, do not escape the presumptions of 
‘traditional’ legal positivist theories.142 There is nothing in legal positivism to resist the 
idea that concurrent legal systems have concurrent claims to supremacy. In fact, some 
classical works on descriptive constitutional pluralism in Europe can be viewed as 
restatements of traditional legal systems theory.143 
In contrast, many legal pluralists include some element of normativity.144 Notable 
constitutional pluralism theories applied to the European Union, for example, claim to 
resolve disagreement and constitutional deadlock through processes of judicial dialogue 
and mutual understanding. The principles and interpretative techniques common to the 
legal systems should be used to avoid inter-system conflict as much as possible, for 
overlapping claims to supremacy are a matter of fact in Europe which has to be dealt 
with.145 Mattias Kumm draws on Dworkin’s non-positivist theory of law to argue that we 
should search for the morally best account of the relationship between concurrent legal 
systems, given their normative commitments towards one another.146 Unwritten 
principles should be used as conflict-resolutions rules to construct morally ideal solutions 
in light of the entire order of legal systems.147 In contrast, in his later, more normatively 
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loaded work on constitutional pluralism, Neil MacCormick resorted to public 
international law, which he claims could serve as the ultimate arbiter between colliding 
legal systems, essentially reinvigorating Kelsenian monism.148 
However, whether or not normative constitutional pluralism can actually help in 
applying the law,149 or whether pluralism in law generally is really something new,150 the 
normativity of constitutional pluralism seems to provide no alternative to the question of 
the proper conception of law, nor to investigations into the self-conception of courts and 
other legal institutions. If the normative obligation on courts to avoid conflict are legal 
ones, they are legally binding either by virtue of their source – in which case constitutional 
pluralism collapses into legal positivism; or by virtue of their merits – in which case it 
collapses into non-positivism.151 If such obligations are not necessarily legal, but in any 
case morally or politically desirable, constitutional pluralism fails to be a theory of law at 
all. 
This conclusion does not in any way affect the moral virtues of pluralism,152 but it 
demonstrates that it possesses no real philosophical added value. For the purpose of 
identifying the essential properties of law, it is not relevant how legal systems and courts 
should behave but how they are necessarily behaving. Even constitutional pluralists 
recognise that courts apply an internal perspective, remaining faithful to the internal 
perspective of their own legal system.153 Tuori claims, however, that ‘[e]xclusive 
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perspectivism and concomitant radical pluralism convey a one-sided and distorted picture 
of our contemporary legal landscape [...] Legal perspectivism in law is inevitable, but 
legal solipsism is not’.154 However, I feel that Raz and his followers would probably reply 
that as a matter of fact, all legal systems do resort to legal solipsism.155 They would 
explain that all legal systems claim supremacy over all other legal and non-legal 
normative systems within their jurisdiction, and that when courts derive inspiration from 
other principles, rules or interpretative techniques from other legal systems, they are 
merely adopting those norms rather than incorporating them.156  
Again, nothing in this article should be understood as an argument against the virtues 
of pluralism and dialogue. What matters from an analytical perspective is the question of 
how extraordinary the claims of the CJEU are regarding the specific characteristics of the 
EU legal system compared to the claims of other courts and legal systems. Arguably, the 
Court’s concerns are shared with those of other constitutional courts because they reveal 
truisms about law as such. Rather than perceiving EU law as something ‘supranational’, 
‘international’ or ‘sui generis’, the CJEU simply perceives the EU legal system – 
following its own construction to this end – as an autonomous legal system mimicking 
national law, claiming supremacy not because it deems itself hierarchically positioned 
above national law, but because this is an inherent part of the imitation. 
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This article aimed to explore the conception of law which underlies the CJEU’s case-law, 
with Opinion 2/13 on the draft agreement for EU accession to the ECHR as a topical 
example. The metaphor of the CJEU as a ‘Dworkinian court’ fails to explain the Court’s 
case-law on autonomy and supremacy of which Opinion 2/13 is the apotheosis. More 
effective fundamental rights protection and sufficient external control by the ECHR and 
the Strasbourg Court must give way to the supremacy claim of the EU legal system. This 
is profoundly incompatible with Dworkin’s interpretative theory of law. The CJEU’s key 
constitutional case-law instead shows how the Court is committed to constructing a legal 
system which possesses the conditions described by Raz, using comprehensiveness and 
openness to maintain the EU legal system’s claim to supremacy within its jurisdiction. 
The storm of academic critique after the Opinion is understandable given that most 
academics silently rely on Dworkinian conceptions of law.157 A proper mutual 
understanding between academia and the judiciary as to their respective legal 
philosophical assumptions is essential for a sensible discussion on whether Opinion 2/13, 
and case-law more generally, is legally sound. 
In this article, I did not want to address the philosophical question of whether the 
CJEU is conceptually destined to be committed to Raz’s theory of legal systems or other 
aspects of his theory of law. I also did not want to answer the normative question of 
whether the CJEU should be more Dworkinian in its conception of law or its criteria of 
legal validity. My objective has merely been to provide an account of how the Court’s 
jurisprudence reveals its implicit philosophical assumptions, and how they differ from 
those of the critics of Opinion 2/13. This analysis leads to three main conclusions. First: 
the supremacy claim of the CJEU is precisely in need of demystification because it is 
inherent to any legal system, and the outcome of Opinion 2/13 is unsurprising. Second: 
the paradox of the Opinion is that it seemingly lives and breathes the idea that the EU 
should be given special treatment by virtue of its specific characteristics which distinguish 
                                                           
157 A wildly speculative guess: this might be explained by the fact that a Dworkinian conception of law 
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it from a State. To the contrary: the Court’s underlying conception of law is essentially 
mimetic of the typical characteristics of national legal systems, which also questions the 
extent to which the EU legal system is a threat to ‘traditional’, allegedly state-focused 
legal philosophy. Third: the mimesis of national law entails a dissociation between the 
legal and political nature of the EU. Whereas the EU is certainly not a State, the EU legal 
system is no different from national legal systems. At bottom, Opinion 2/13 is not the 
apotheosis of a perplexing chain of jurisprudence, but rather quite typical of law as we 
know it: ‘pretentious and rife with an inflated sense of its own importance’.158 
 
 
                                                           
158 Gardner (n 78) 619. 
